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Rethinking Maine government: The past, the present, and 
the future 
Maine Policy Review (1993). Volume 2, Number 1 
The budget difficulties faced by Maine and by most other states have prompted a national search 
for better ways to deliver government services. In Maine, a conference entitled "Rethinking 
Maine Government" was held at the University of Maine on January 5-6, 1993 under the 
auspices of the Margaret Chase Smith Center for Public Policy. MPR has selected three of the 
presentations at that conference for this issue (and likely will include other selections in future 
issues). Anthony Cahill challenged the 400 legislators, state government officials and business 
leaders attending the conference to think in terms of a "revolution" in rethinking Maine's state 
government. Donald Nicoll was the co-chair, along with Merton Henry, of the Special 
Commission on Governmental Restructuring. Kenneth Palmer provided a historical view on 
previous efforts to reorganize Maine government.  
Challenges facing Maine's budget process  
by Donald Nicoll, Co-chair Special Commission on Governmental Restructuring  
Rethinking state government includes rethinking how government makes decisions, implements 
and evaluates policy goals and objectives, establishes program priorities, and sets budget revenue 
and expenditure levels. The Special Commission on Governmental Restructuring concluded that 
moving the boxes of government will not make a significant difference in our budget problems 
unless major changes are made in the way public policy establishes goals and objectives, sets 
program priorities, and determines the level and distribution of public funds.  
Traditional priority-setting  
There are four essential problems with the way we have traditionally made decisions about 
Maine state government priorities and expressed them through revenues and expenditures. First, 
we have set our goals and objectives in terms of process and units of service, rather than 
outcomes or results. State departments are accountable for spending within appropriation lines 
and for carrying out a certain volume of work. The agencies do not have meaningful goals that 
would determine if they have made a difference in the lives of Maine citizens or the quality of 
the environment, or the state of Maine's economic and social health. Reasonable measures for 
executive branch performance are absent.  
Second, the process of setting revenue and expenditure estimates is backward-looking. Biennial 
expenditure decisions are pegged to the last biennium's revenue performance, earlier 
commitments, and earlier personal income patterns. Increases in program commitments are tied 
to peaks in personal income growth.  
Figure 1 shows revenues and expenditures for Maine's General Fund. Revenues peaked about 
two years before the height of the expenditure curve. This suggests that the executive and 
legislative branches were basing their commitments of funds and their estimates of revenues on 
what occurred two years before. They were not responding to a forecast of where the economy 
was likely to be. This is reinforced by comparing the trends in gross personal income and the 
General Fund. General Fund revenues vary with personal income, but show wider fluctuations. 
The increase in General Fund revenues in 1987 and the crash in revenues in 1990 and 1991 
illustrate these larger fluctuations.  
Figure 1: Growth in Personal Income and Gen Fund  
 
Charles S. Colgan, "The Road to Fiscal Hell," paper prepared for Conference on The Fiscal Crisis in the 
Northeast, April 8, 1992, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston. 
The second graph, Figure 2, shows the change in real personal income growth rates from 1976 to 
1991. The growth rate of income dipped in the early 1980s, bounced back in the mid-1980s, 
reaching a peak about 1987-88, and then dropped off. The trend line in the middle of Figure 2 
represents the long-term trend in personal income growth. The shaded area represents, in effect, 
the unusual growth in income in the mid- to late-1980s upon which appropriations were based 
and new programs were established, without apparent regard for the long-term economic trend. 
Figure 2: Real Personal Income Growth Rates (Year to Year) 
 
Charles S. Colgan, "The Road to Fiscal Hell," paper prepared for Conference on The Fiscal Crisis in the 
Northeast, April 8, 1992, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston. 
 
Third, Maine has accepted the biennium as the real limit on its program and financial planning. 
Long-term implications of program commitments or expenditure levels have not been calculated. 
In some arenas, such as education and social welfare commitments, this has resulted in 
substantial continuing obligations, some of which were not really anticipated.  
Fourth, and as a consequence of the first three problems, the spending pattern in Maine state 
government booms in good times, or actually just after the conclusion of those good times, and 
crashes in hard times, when the needs are at their peak.  
Several budgeting problems exacerbate these patterns. An effective and consistent public capital 
budget is absent. Tax exemptions that benefit particular groups or constituencies are not 
identified as expenditures, even though those exemptions are, in effect, public resources applied 
to specific purposes. We do not keep track of special and dedicated revenue allocations or federal 
expenditures in any meaningful way. As a result, there is a significant gap in our ability to match 
public expenditure decisions with program priorities.  
What are the general results of those problems? First, Maine's budgeting process, which really 
drives its priority setting, is retrospective. Revenue and expenditure policies are not managed 
mid-term or long-term. Tax and expenditure policies are reactive. We have what I call "yo-yo 
budgeting," played to a delayed beat. Second, as a consequence of flawed budget process and 
failure to set definable outcome goals and objectives, Maine state government wastes resources, 
undermines programs, disrupts lives, and increases the level of frustration in relations among 
branches of government, levels of government, contractors, and constituencies.  
Suggestions for doing it differently  
What can we do about it? Here are some suggestions gleaned from several sources:  
• Change program planning in state government to reflect clear definitions and descriptions 
of priority issues that are to be addressed and include outcome-oriented goals and 
objectives. Make executive branch departments and agencies accountable for achieving 
those outcome-oriented goals and objectives.  
• Involve substantive program legislative committees (e.g., the Education Committee on 
education issues) in the process of setting program, and thus budget priorities. These 
committees should work with the Appropriations and Finance and Taxation Committees. 
[Since this suggestion was made by the author, the legislature has to some degree adopted 
this recommendation.] 
• Develop forward-looking, consistent levels of base funding for state programs that are 
tied to long-term economic trends. The states of Michigan and Indiana have expenditure 
control plans that are tied to long-term trends in personal income. Identifying the 
projected levels of spending and related revenue requirements, would, under the proposal, 
be based on the work of a consensus forecasting commission, as recommended by the 
restructuring commission, and similar to that set up by Governor McKeman.  
• Create a reserve fund for periods of economic downturn by sequestering revenues 
collected in excess of projected expenditure requirements during periods of stable or 
increasing economic activity and revenue generation. That fund would have to be much 
larger than the rainy day fund, with its 25 million dollar limit. It should be tied to 
economic growth, not ad hoc budgetary decisions. Give the legislature the opportunity to 
choose how those funds should be applied in times of economic difficulty, whether for 
infrastructure, tax cuts, or short-term emergency needs.  
• Develop a capital plan with a variety of mechanisms to fund long-term investments, 
which should be identified through cost-benefit analysis as appropriate to state needs.  
• Require the budget to include out-year estimates of expenditures that reflect the 
cumulative fiscal impact of bills passed by the current legislature. Initially, those 
estimates should at least reach through the next biennium. Require the budget to include 
expenditure estimates related to tax exemptions, and federal expenditures in the state. 
Those estimates should identify the beneficiary groups and the priority of those programs 
in relation to other state-funded programs. A continuing effort should be made to identify 
and correct unfunded liabilities as part of Maine's strategic planning and budgeting 
process.  
• Finally, program reviews should be conducted regularly by substantive committees in the 
legislature. The criteria for evaluating programs should start with performance measures 
in relation to strategic goals and objectives and should include management 
performance.  
These suggestions represent only a few potential changes that could pay dividends for Maine in 
the years ahead. The report of the Special Commission on Governmental Restructuring, the 
recommendations of which are summarized below, contains many others. These and other 
suggestions ought to be given further serious consideration by the Legislature.  
Selected highlights of the Report of the Special Commission on Governmental Restructuring 
of 1991  
The Special Commission on Governmental Restructuring began its work in May of 1991 under a 
mandate to create a plan "to maximize citizen participation in public policy making, to use public 
resources more effectively and to consolidate and restructure State Government in such a way 
that efficiency is assured and cost savings result." As the Commission addressed its mandate, it 
developed five standards by which to judge any restructuring proposal. Such recommendations 
should be aimed at: (1) increasing public participation in and access to public policy decisions; 
(2) increasing the public accountability of government officials; (3) improving the effectiveness 
of government programs; (4) improving the efficiency of government programs; and (5) reducing 
negative economic or social impact of government programs.  
Among the recommendations of the Commission were:  
• Building state government budgets from strategic plans that establish expected outcomes 
and measurable performance objectives and set existing and new program priorities.  
• A strict limit on expenditures based on the long-term average growth rate in the real 
purchasing power of revenues.  
• The clear identification in the budget of all expenditures for state programs, including 
federal funds, State General Fund expenditures for federally-funded programs, and tax 
exemptions.  
• Depositing surplus funds collected into a reserve fund, to be appropriated in years of 
revenue shortfalls upon the Governor's recommendation and the Legislature's two-thirds 
vote. Funds would be surplus if they exceeded expenditure limits determined based on 
the long-term average growth rate in revenues.  
• Making capital investments under a plan based on long-term cost/benefit analyses. The 
state budget document should be divided into an operating budget and a capital budget.  
• The formation of a Consensus Forecasting Committee by the Governor and Legislature.  
• That the policy committees of the legislature be more fully integrated into the 
appropriations process and that they assume responsibility for more detailed program 
reviews.  
• That the State Auditor be nominated by the Governor and elected by a two-thirds 
majority of the legislature for a term of seven years. In addition to financial audits, the 
Auditor would conduct management performance audits and report to the Governor and 
Legislature.  
• That all three branches begin implementing Total Quality Management by the end of 
1992.  
• Divestiture of state retail liquor sales to the private sector, and consideration of the 
following state service areas for private contracting: lottery operations; certain 
correctional and mental health facilities and services; certain laboratory facilities; 
buildings and grounds services; and certain bill processing, printing and publishing, and 
risk management operations.  
• The creation by the Governor of a Facilities Consolidation Commission to oversee 
Bureau of Public Improvement's analysis of state facilities needs, rule on BPI 
recommendations for sale of state-owned properties, and report annually to the Governor 
and Legislature.  
• That the departments and agencies providing education, health, social, and employment 
services, and those in natural resources, work with the State Planning Office to plan 
consolidation of state government regions and co-location of service offices. 
• That the number of boards and commissions be reduced wherever possible to one such 
entity for each department. 
• The combination of all advocacy services in a State Office of Advocacy, located as a 
separate agency within the Executive Department. 
• The creation of the Interdepartmental Council as an office of the Executive Department, 
with a director representing the Governor, an independent budget and staff, and authority 
to foster collaboration, allocate resources, and settle disputes among health and social 
service agencies. 
• The abolition of the Departments of Human Services and Mental Health and Mental 
Retardation, and the realignment of their functions into a Department of Children and 
Families and a Department of Health and Developmental Services.  
• The abolition of the Division of Community Services and redistribution of its functions to 
other agencies.  
• The consolidation of services for people who are homeless at the Maine State Housing 
Authority.  
• The placement of some rehabilitation services in the Department of Health and 
Developmental Services and some in the Department of Labor.  
• Study of whether juvenile correctional services should remain within the Department of 
Corrections or be moved to the Department of Children and Families.  
• That the Legislature create a Public Education Strategic Planning Council, with 
membership from each of the four educational delivery systems, the Department of 
Education, and the State Board of Education. The council's primary responsibility would 
be to create a long-term strategic plan for Maine public education.  
• That the University of Maine System Board and Maine Maritime Academy Board of 
Trustees, with advice from the Strategic Planning Council, examine options, including 
possible addition of the Academy to the campuses of UMS, to accomplish coordination, 
planning, and savings within and between the System and the Academy.  
• That the BEP be abolished and that the Commissioner of DEP assume all of the Board's 
responsibilities, with the exception of appeals. A three-member appeals board should be 
established.  
• Abolishing the existing DEP bureau structure and reorganizing it along the following 
functional lines: Licensing, Technical Services, and Enforcement.  
• The merger of the Departments of Finance and Administration.  
• The appointment of the State Treasurer by the Commissioner of the new Department of 
Finance and Administration. The Treasurer would serve at the Commissioner's pleasure.  
• A reduction in the size of the Legislature to no more than 35 Senate seats and 123 House 
seats and no less than 33 Senate seats and 99 House seats. The objectives of such a 
reduction are to strengthen the continuity between Senate and House seats, and to 
enhance the capacity of House members to work more closely together.  
Donald E. Nicoll of Portland is an independent consultant on program and policy planning. He 
served as chair of Gov. Kenneth M. Curtis' task force on government reorganization in the early 
1970s and most recently, he co-chaired, with Merton Henry, the Special Commission on 
Governmental Restructuring (1991). He has had a long career in politics as a legislative aide 
and as the chairman of numerous state government commissions.  
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